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ESSAYS 
THE INVISIBILITY OF JURISDICTIONAL PROCEDURE AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES 
Justin R. Pidot

 
Abstract 
Modern standing doctrine has been the subject of substantial scholarly 
inquiry. Critics charge that it allows judges to resolve cases based on their 
own ideologies, favoring corporations over individuals and those who 
harm over those harmed. The doctrine likewise disserves social justice, 
preventing adjudication of indisputably meritorious claims. Yet the focus 
on the substance of standing doctrine has obscured an equally significant 
impediment to justice created by the procedures that judges use to 
adjudicate questions of standing and subject matter jurisdiction generally. 
The unusual dimensions of jurisdictional procedure have largely escaped 
notice. This Essay interrogates the history and context of jurisdictional 
procedure, offers an explanation for its invisibility, and identifies the 
consequences of that neglect. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In liberal circles, it has become de rigueur to complain that modern 
standing doctrine allows judges to resolve cases based on their own 
ideologies.
1
 As Dan Farber recently explained, ―[t]he unpredictability and 
                                                                                                                     
  Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to thank 
Alan Chen, Scott Dodson, Ian Farrell, Barbara Fried, Mark Kelman, Larry Kramer, Douglas Kysar, 
Nancy Leong, Jedediah Purdy, and Marty Redish for their thoughts and insights. I am grateful to my 
research assistant, Todd Likman, for all his work. 
 1. Authorities disagree as to whether ideology influences standing decisions. Compare 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1760 (1998) (arguing 
that standing decisions correlate highly with ideology), with Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612 (2004) (arguing that standing decisions are less political than often 
believed). Whatever the data show, the ideological valance of standing decisions has gained wide 
1
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ideological nature of standing law seems inherent in the three-part test, 
whose terms seem to serve as a kind of Rorschach inkblot allowing each 
Justice to project her own worldview onto each case.‖2 The substance of 
standing doctrine privileges the powerful, favoring corporations over 
individuals and those who harm over those harmed. The doctrine likewise 
disserves social justice, preventing adjudication of indisputably meritorious 
claims. 
 Yet the focus on the substance of standing doctrine has obscured an 
equally significant impediment to justice created by the procedures that 
judges use to adjudicate questions of standing and subject matter 
jurisdiction generally. Elsewhere, I have developed a detailed analysis of 
jurisdictional procedure.
3
 Here, however, my goal is to identify the reasons 
that jurisdictional procedure as it relates to standing doctrine has largely 
escaped notice and to consider the consequences of that neglect.  
 To that end, Part I explores the contours of jurisdictional procedure and 
the profound implications for the fairness of proceedings. Longstanding 
authority makes clear that jurisdictional procedure is cut from different 
cloth than the ordinary adversarial process that takes place in federal 
courts. Judges—not parties—have the ultimate obligation to identify 
defects in a court‘s jurisdiction. And when appellate courts identify such 
problems, or find that the district court erred in its own consideration, they 
typically determine jurisdiction themselves based on whatever facts happen 
to be in the district court record, rather than remanding to allow the trial 
judge to apply the correct legal standard. This procedure has particular 
consequences for the adjudication of standing because it results in courts 
dismissing cases even where plaintiffs could prove standing if allowed to 
introduce additional evidence. The ability to exclude plaintiffs with 
potentially meritorious claims renders jurisdictional procedure vulnerable 
to judicial manipulation in service of ideologically-driven outcomes.  
 If jurisdictional procedure so significantly affects standing doctrine, 
then why has it received so little scholarly attention? Part II explores this 
question. Much of the considerable discussion of standing prevalent in the 
literature essentially responds to a substantive and exceedingly narrow 
vision of the doctrine articulated by Justice Antonin Scalia in his 
scholarship and jurisprudence. Although Scalia‘s vision largely has not 
taken root in the Supreme Court, the conversation about its merits persists, 
                                                                                                                     
acceptance. See, e.g., Dan Farber, Standing on Hot Air: American Electric Power and the 
Bankruptcy of Standing Doctrine, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 121, 122 (2011). 
 2. Farber, supra note 1, at 122. The three-part test to which Farber refers is easy to recite but 
difficult to apply. The U.S. Constitution requires that a plaintiff demonstrate injury, causation, and 
redressability to invoke federal judicial power. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
562 (1992). 
 3. See Justin R. Pidot, Jurisdictional Procedure, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (forthcoming 
Nov. 2012), working draft available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1872623. 
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obscuring problems of procedure. Legal scholarship also focuses on 
substantive standing doctrine because it remains relevant to niche, but 
particularly salient, areas of the law such as climate-change litigation.
4
 Yet 
lawsuits related to climate change occupy only a small corner of public 
law, and while they present important questions about substantive standing 
doctrine, we should not focus myopically on them to the exclusion of the 
more universal issues of jurisdictional procedure. 
More generally, jurisdictional procedure remains largely invisible 
because sometime in the last century, it evolved from a creature of statute 
into a construct of the Constitution. This transformation passed largely 
unnoticed. As a result, the procedures courts use to decide questions of 
standing are assumed inevitable, and thus receive little scrutiny.  
 Part III argues that making jurisdictional procedure visible matters 
because jurisdictional procedure can and should evolve to achieve fairer 
results. A better jurisdictional procedure would ensure that jurisdiction is 
decided on an accurate view of the facts and would quell judicial 
temptation to use standing as a foil for ideology. Recommendations for 
comprehensive reform lie beyond the scope of this Essay, and I undertake 
that project in other work.
5
 But simply getting jurisdictional procedure on 
the agenda is a critical step toward its improvement. This Essay‘s 
objective, therefore, is to make clear the importance of jurisdictional 
procedure and to highlight its urgent need for reform. Such reform also 
provides fruitful opportunities to accomplish the justice and fairness goals 
of those who advocate for liberalization of substantive standing doctrine. 
I.  JURISDICTIONAL PROCEDURE‘S UNFAIRNESS 
Standing serves as a trap for the unwary, resulting in parties losing 
potentially meritorious cases because they did not foresee the facts that 
courts ultimately decided were necessary to establish standing. The 
ambiguity and vagueness of current standing doctrine makes it particularly 
difficult for plaintiffs to make accurate predictions about which facts courts 
will require.  Jurisdictional procedure permits and even facilitates this 
pervasive unfairness. The aspects of this procedure with which I am 
concerned flow from courts‘ obligation to assure themselves of jurisdiction. 
Accomplishing that obligation has two procedural facets. First, courts of all 
levels raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte. Second, in resolving those 
issues, appellate courts and the Supreme Court typically rely on whatever 
facts happen to be in the district court record, even if no concern over 
jurisdiction arose during that phase of the litigation. Each facet contributes 
                                                                                                                     
 4. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 1, at 122; Benjamin Ewing & Douglas Kysar, Prods and 
Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 387–400 (2011); 
Tyler Welti, Note, Massachusetts v. EPA’s Regulatory Interest Theory: A Victory for the Climate, 
Not Public Law Plaintiffs, 94 VA. L. REV. 1751, 1751–52 (2008). 
 5. See Pidot, supra note 3, working draft at 31–41. 
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to the problems faced by plaintiffs. 
The way that courts address jurisdiction differs significantly from the 
ordinary adversarial procedures that dominate federal courts.
6
 We pride 
ourselves on our adversarial tradition
7
 and the heart of an adversarial 
proceeding is ―the presence of a judge who does not (as an inquisitor does) 
conduct the factual and legal investigation himself, but instead decides on 
the basis of facts and arguments pro and con adduced by the parties.‖8 The 
duty of judges to consider jurisdiction independently charges them with 
performing legal investigation—the antithesis of adversarial proceedings. 
At the same time, courts do not investigate the facts relevant to 
jurisdiction, leaving that task to the parties (even if the parties do not know 
that a standing issue may arise). As a result, jurisdictional procedure is a 
strange hybrid—inquisitorial when it comes to law and adversarial when it 
comes to facts. 
Courts also exercise unusual appellate procedures in considering 
jurisdictional issues. When matters other than jurisdiction are involved, 
courts of appeals typically remand if they determine that the district court 
                                                                                                                     
 6. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 readily reveals the unique procedures courts use to 
address jurisdiction. Rule 12 governs responsive pleadings and identifies various defenses that a 
party may wish to present. The defenses are familiar: lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, improper venue, failure to join an indispensible party, 
and so forth. The rule then provides that ―[a] motion asserting any of these defenses must be made 
before pleading if a responsive pleading is allowed,‖ or else the defense is waived. FED. R. CIV. P. 
12(b), (h). With the exception of subject-matter jurisdiction, that is. Rule 12(h)(3) provides that 
―[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss 
the action.‖ 
 7. See, e.g., Church of the Lakumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 572–
73 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (―Sound judicial decision 
making requires both a vigorous prosecution and a vigorous defense of the issues in dispute.‖ 
(quotation marks omitted)); Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) (―[T]ruth—as well as 
fairness—is best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the question.‖ (quotation 
marks omitted)); Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (explaining that the American 
legal system ―assumes that adversarial testing will ultimately advance the public interest in truth and 
fairness‖); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (―[O]ur legal tradition regards the adversary 
process as the best means of ascertaining truth and minimizing the risk of error . . . .‖); LON FULLER, 
The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 40 (H. Berman ed., 1971) (―[A]dversary 
presentation [is] the only effective means of combating [the] human tendency to judge too swiftly in 
terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully known.‖); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW 
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 325 (1960) (expressing deep skepticism ―for any decision which is 
placed in part on any basis dug up by the court itself, but which is therefore new to the parties to the 
case‖); 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN 
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1395, at 94 (2d ed. 1923) (―The opponent demands confrontation, not 
for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness . . . but for the purpose of cross-examination, which 
cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining of immediate 
answer.‖); cf. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting the 
rule that issues may not be raised for the first time on appeal ―distinguishes our adversary system 
from the inquisitorial one‖). 
 8. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.2 (1991). 
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applied the wrong legal standard to allow the trial judge to apply the 
correct law to the facts in the first instance. This practice sensibly accounts 
for the respective competencies of appellate and district courts. As the 
Supreme Court has explained, ―trial judges have the unique opportunity to 
consider the evidence in the living courtroom context, while appellate 
judges see only the cold paper record.‖9 But appellate courts and the 
Supreme Court usually ignore the practice of remanding when it comes to 
issues of jurisdiction. Instead, they nearly always decide for themselves 
whether the plaintiffs have standing, applying the legal standard they have 
articulated to the evidence placed before the district court—even though 
the district court never considered standing.
10
  
To illustrate these general principles, consider three examples of 
procedures (rather than substantive standing doctrine) leading to dismissal 
where intuition suggests that the plaintiff could have met the legal standard 
applied by the appellate court:  
In Heartwood, Inc. v. Agpaoa,
11
 an environmental organization sued 
the U.S. Forest Service alleging that a timber sale in the Daniel Boone 
National Forest violated the Endangered Species Act. The Sixth Circuit 
dismissed for lack of standing because the organization alleged only that its 
members visited the forest, not that they visited the precise corner of the 
forest slated for harvest.
12
  
The environmental plaintiffs in Heartwood did not lose their case just 
because of the stringency of the substantive standard applied by the court. 
Instead, their loss was the direct result of the procedure the court used. The 
Sixth Circuit raised standing sua sponte when the factual record was closed 
and decided that the environmental plaintiffs lacked standing based on the 
existing record. Such a procedure exists in an uncomfortable no-man‘s-
land between adversarialism and inquisitorialism. Had the court applied 
                                                                                                                     
 9. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 438 (1996); see also McNary v. 
Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 497 (1991) (courts of appeals ―lack the factfinding and 
record-developing capabilities of a federal district court‖). There are exceptions, of course. For 
example, ―although inadequate findings and conclusions may be remanded to the district court for 
supplementation, ‗we will not remand a case for more specific findings if doing so will consume 
precious time and judicial resources without serving any purpose.‘‖ McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 
606, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting LaSalle Extension Univ. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 481, 485 (D.C. Cir. 
1980) (per curiam)). 
 10. See, e.g., Heartwood v. Agpaoa, 628 F.3d 261, 266 (6th Cir. 2010); Dias v. City & Cnty. 
of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1176 (10th Cir. 2009); see also Gaslin v. Fassler, 377 F. App‘x 579,  
579 (8th Cir. 2010). While the majority of appellate decisions finding that lower courts have 
overlooked a jurisdictional issue or misapprehended the relevant law proceed to order the case 
dismissed, courts do on occasion, and without explanation, deviate from this rule. See Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 
263 F. App‘x 348, 356 (4th Cir. 2008); Pa. Prison Soc‘y v. Cortes, 508 F.3d 156, 159 (3d Cir. 
2007); see also Pidot, supra note 3, working draft at 36–40. 
 11. 628 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 12. Id. at 268–69. 
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ordinary adversarial norms, it would not have raised standing sua sponte. 
And if the Sixth Circuit had investigated the facts itself or remanded to the 
district court, it seems virtually certain that Heartwood would have been 
found to have a member—and it claimed many members living around the 
Daniel Boone National Forest—who visited the timber-sale area.13 
United States v. Diekemper
14
 provides a second example. Here, a 
husband and wife who had been married for thirty-five years pleaded guilty 
to fraudulently concealing assets at their dairy farm after they declared 
bankruptcy. The wife received two years of probation subject to the 
condition that she refrain from all contact with her husband.
15
 The husband 
received a sentence of more than ten years and as part of his appeal of the 
sentence challenged the parole condition that would prevent his wife from 
visiting him in jail.
16
 The court first held that it could not review the wife‘s 
probation condition because she had not appealed. But, then, in the 
alternative, the court held that the husband lacked Article III standing 
because ―[w]ithout some affidavits from Mrs. Diekemper that absent her 
probation condition she would visit her husband, we have no way of 
knowing that she would in fact do so.‖17 The court may well have been 
correct that the husband could not challenge the wife‘s probation 
condition, but jurisdictional procedure provided a convenient alternative 
means of disposing of the case based on the fact that after thirty-five years 
of marriage, the wife had not declared that she desired to visit her husband 
during his incarceration.  
The case most often cited as a paragon of restrictive standing—Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife—provides a third example. In that case, the Supreme 
Court held that Defenders of Wildlife lacked standing because it had not 
provided evidence that its members had sufficiently immediate and 
                                                                                                                     
 13. Because dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are without prejudice, plaintiffs 
like Heartwood may be able to file new suits alleging additional standing facts. But this can only 
occur if the statute of limitations has not yet run, meaning that the plaintiffs‘ ability to secure 
judicial relief depends on the amount of time the court takes in identifying and resolving a 
jurisdictional problem. In some circumstances, the doctrine of direct estoppel may preclude certain 
efforts at relitigation. See Steele v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 355 F.3d 1204, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004); 
Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702 F.2d 1189, 1192 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1983). But direct estoppel will 
rarely be an obstacle because it does not apply ―where a jurisdictional defect has been cured or loses 
its controlling force.‖ Eaton v. Weaver Mfg. Co., 582 F.2d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir. 1978); see also 
Dozier, 702 F.2d at 1192 & n. 4; WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER § 4437 at 180: 
In ordinary circumstances a second action on the same claim is not precluded by 
dismissal of a first action for prematurity or failure to satisfy a precondition to suit. 
No more need be done than await maturity, satisfy the precondition, or switch to a 
different substantive theory that does not depend on the same precondition. 
 14. 604 F.3d 345, 350 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 15. Id. at 349. 
 16. Id. at 349–50. 
 17. Id. at 350. 
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concrete plans to visit areas on foreign soil inhabited by endangered 
species and threatened with destruction by projects funded by the United 
States federal government. In concurrence, Justice Anthony Kennedy 
suggested that Defenders could have proven standing if its members had 
―acquire[d] airline tickets to the project sites or announce[d] a date certain 
upon which they will return.‖18 
The airline-ticket rule garnered significant attention and a bit of 
ridicule,
19
 but application of that rule to the actual facts might well have 
allowed Defenders to pursue its claims. Defenders is a large organization, 
boasting nearly one million members.
20
 Had the Supreme Court remanded 
to the district court, Defenders would likely have been able to identify a 
member with a plane ticket in hand. So again, jurisdictional procedure, in 
addition to substantive standing doctrine, is to blame for a case‘s premature 
termination. 
Moreover, this procedure may appeal to ideologically-motivated 
judges—either on a conscious or unconscious level—as a way of avoiding 
the merits of cases.
21
 Imagine a judge whose ideological commitments 
strongly disfavor a plaintiff who appears to have a meritorious legal claim. 
Standing can provide a relatively easy way of disposing of the case. The 
doctrine is vague and indeterminate. And if the court announces a new or 
modified rule of standing, the accepted practice is that it can dismiss the 
case without remand for further proceedings in which the plaintiff might be 
able to satisfy whatever standard the court has now announced.   
II.  JURISDICTIONAL PROCEDURE‘S INVISIBILITY 
So why do scholars concerned about access to courts focus on the 
substance of standing doctrine, rather than jurisdictional procedure? The 
answer is twofold: first, the substantive limitations on standing proposed 
by Justice Scalia have captured the attention of the academy, even if they 
have found only minor purchase in the courts; second, we view the metes 
and bounds of jurisdictional procedure as unchanging and unchangeable. In 
combination, these circumstances have led to a narrative of jurisdiction in 
which procedure is all but invisible. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 18. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 579 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 19. See, e.g., id. at 591 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Beth Brennan & Matt Clifford, Standing, 
Ripeness, and Forest Plan Appeals, 17 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 125, 140 (1996); Ann 
Carlson, Standing for the Environment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 931, 950–51 & n. 114 (1998); Cass R. 
Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, ―Injuries,‖ and Article III, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 163, 226–27 (1992); Patricia M. Wald, Colloquia, The Cinematic Supreme Court: 1991–92 
Term, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 238, 241–42 (1993). 
 20. See Mission and History, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, http://www.defenders.org/about_us/ 
history /index.php (last visited July 29, 2012). The organization formed in 1947 and was over forty 
years old by the time Defenders of Wildlife was decided. See id. 
 21. See Pierce, supra note 1, at 1749. 
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Scholarship on standing largely consists of a debate between those 
supporting restrictive substantive requirements that often deny public-
interest plaintiffs ready access to federal courts and those advocating for 
liberal rules that would generally grant a federal forum.
22
  
Justice Scalia, champion of restrictive standing, first articulated his 
views in an article he published while a judge on the D.C. Circuit. He 
explained that ―when an individual who is the very object of a law‘s 
requirement or prohibition seeks to challenge it, he always has standing.‖23 
But others whom Congress has legislated to protect face a more difficult 
path to the courthouse: 
Unless the plaintiff can show some respect in which he is 
harmed more than the rest of us . . . he has not established any 
basis for concern that the majority is suppressing or ignoring 
the rights of a minority that wants protection, and thus has not 
established the prerequisite for juridical intervention.
24
 
                                                                                                                     
 22. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION 201, 
211–15 (2010) (arguing that restrictive standing doctrine is ―one of the most pernicious aspects of 
the conservative assault on the Constitution‖); MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A 
SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 282 (2000) (arguing in support of 
restrictive standing to prevent plaintiff manipulation of courts); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial 
Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1681–84 (2004) 
(arguing that restrictive standing prevents judicial encroachment into executive functions); John D. 
Echeverria, Standing and Mootness Decisions in the Wake of Laidlaw, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 183, 
185–86 (2003) (arguing that Justice Scalia‘s conservative vision of standing was repudiated by 
Laidlaw); Heather Elliott, Standing Lessons: What We Can Learn When Conservative Plaintiffs 
Lose Under Article III Standing Doctrine, 87 IND. L.J. 551, 586–87 (2012) (arguing that cases 
brought by ideologically conservative plaintiffs may prod the Supreme Court to liberalize standing 
doctrine); Daniel A. Farber, A Place-Based Theory of Standing, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1505, 1508 
(2008) (suggesting an alternative to injury-in-fact in environmental litigation based on geographic 
relationships); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223–24 (1988) 
(arguing that courts use standing analysis to inappropriately restrict Congress); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., 
Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 326–27 (2001) 
(arguing that the injury-in-fact analysis stacks the deck in favor of economically advantaged 
litigants); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions 
of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 519–20 (1994) (arguing that restrictive standing 
doctrine is necessary to preserve judicial resources). Commentators have also undertaken 
substantial empirical analysis to determine the practical effect of standing doctrine. See generally, 
e.g., Pierce, supra note 1; Staudt, supra note 1; Christopher Warshaw & Gregory E. Wannier, 5 
HARV. L. & POL‘Y REV. 289 (2011) (analyzing environmental standing cases to assess whether 
regulatory beneficiaries are disadvantaged by standing doctrine); see also Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. 
Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine? An Empirical Study of the Evolution of 
Standing, 62 STAN. L. REV. 5981 (2010) (applying statistical analysis to theories about the origin of 
standing doctrine); Martin H. Redish, Pleading, Discovery, and the Federal Rules: Exploring the 
Foundations of Modern Procedure, 64 FLA. L. REV. 845, 876 (2012). 
 23. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of 
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 894 (1983). 
 24. Id. at 894–95. 
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When President Ronald Reagan elevated Scalia to the Supreme Court, 
there was much concern in liberal circles about his views on standing.
25
 
Then in 1990, Scalia authored the decision in Defenders of Wildlife v. 
Lujan, seeming to enshrine his views in law. He wrote: 
When the suit is one challenging the legality of 
government action or inaction, the nature and extent of facts 
that must be averred (at the summary judgment stage) or 
proved (at the trial stage) in order to establish standing 
depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an 
object of the action (or forgone action) at issue. If he is, there 
is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has 
caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or 
requiring the action will redress it. When, however, as in this 
case, a plaintiff's asserted injury arises from the government's 
allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of 
someone else, much more is needed.
26
 
Defenders of Wildlife initially appeared to have far-reaching effect. 
Commentators lamented that the decision served as the death knell of 
citizen suits, which Congress had incorporated as an essential means of 
enforcing environmental laws.
27
 As Cass Sunstein explained, ―the decision 
ranks among the most important in history in terms of the sheer number of 
federal statutes that it apparently has invalidated.‖28 The decision, and 
particularly its philosophical bent, suggested that corporations (often the 
object of regulation) would find more hospitable reception in the halls of 
federal courts than individuals (often the beneficiaries of regulation).
29
 It 
seemed that courts would consider the complaints of those responsible for 
harming others, but not the complaints of those harmed (especially when a 
regulated entity harmed many people at once).  
But Defenders of Wildlife itself heralded the demise of Justice Scalia‘s 
approach. As already described, Justice Kennedy‘s concurrence suggested 
that the very plaintiffs before the court would have standing if they had 
previously purchased a ticket to visit the foreign areas they sought to 
                                                                                                                     
 25. See, e.g., Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 99th Cong. 196, 211 (1986) (statement of Lawrence Gold, General Counsel, AFL-CIO); 
id. at 267 (statement of Audrey Feinberg, Consultant to the Supreme Court Watch Project of the 
Nation Institute); id. at 298 (statement of Robert Maddox, Executive Director, Americans United 
for Separation of Church and State). 
 26. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992).  
 27. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006) (citizen suit provision); 
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006) (citizen suit provisions); Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2006) (citizen suit provision); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 
(2006) (citizen suit provision).  
 28. See Sunstein, supra note 19, at 163, 165. 
 29. See Nichol, supra note 22, at 316–18. 
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preserve.
30
 Kennedy explained that the airline-ticket rule may ―seem 
trivial‖ but that it served an important purpose because the Court could not 
―assume that the affiants will be using the sites on a regular basis.‖31 
Requiring plaintiffs to purchase plane tickets is trivial, and even absurd. 
But such a rule thoroughly undermines Scalia‘s goal of substantially 
limiting the court access of regulatory beneficiaries. Under an airline-ticket 
rule, anyone can litigate on behalf of the public as long as they first make 
travel plans (or prove their interest in the matter in question in some 
equally inconsequential fashion). 
Justice Kennedy‘s more lenient vision of standing has carried the day, 
and, under current doctrine, regulatory beneficiaries generally can access 
courts. That outcome became apparent in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Environmental Services, where the Court held that people have 
standing if they modify their behavior in response to a defendant‘s 
actions.
32
 After Laidlaw, standing doctrine imposed few substantive 
limitations and largely devolved into today‘s complicated and sometimes 
ill-defined procedural trap for unwary plaintiffs.
33
  
The scholarly debate has not kept up with these changes. Even after 
Laidlaw, analysis of standing continued to focus on its substantive content, 
not its procedural rules.
34
 One explanation is the sheer audacity of Scalia‘s 
vision of transforming the terms ―case‖ and ―controversy‖ in Article III 
into a constitutional prohibition on courts providing relief to those 
individuals suffering harm at the hands of those violating environmental 
and other public-interest laws. Such bold claims tend to capture attention.
35
 
Relatedly, substantive standing law remains important in a few high-profile 
niches. For example, the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether injuries 
                                                                                                                     
 30. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 31. Id. 
 32. 528 U.S. 167, 181–83 (2000); see also Robert V. Percival & Joanna B. Goger, Escaping 
the Common Law’s Shadow: Standing in the Light of Laidlaw, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y F. 119, 
121 (2001). 
 33. There are limited circumstances where standing doctrine substantively constrains 
plaintiffs. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that 
a plaintiff lacks standing to challenge government action that threatens her with only a slightly 
increased risk of injury. See Pub. Citizen v. Nat‘l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 
1291–98 (D.C. Cir. 2007), subsequent determination, 513 F.3d 234, 240–41 (D.C. Cir. 2008). This 
rule effectively prevents anyone from challenging regulations that impose wide-spread, low-
magnitude risks. See Amanda Leiter, Substance or Illusion? The Dangers of Imposing a Standing 
Threshold, 97 GEO. L.J. 391, 403–05 (2009). 
 34. For example, according to a search of Westlaw‘s JLR database, Scalia‘s article has been 
cited in over 450 articles appearing in law reviews and journals, including more than 250 since 
Laidlaw was decided and thirty since the beginning of 2010.  
 35. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1432, 1480 & n.232 (1988) (suggesting that standing decisions are the modern equivalent of 
the Lochner era ―when constitutional provisions were similarly interpreted so as to frustrate 
regulatory initiatives in deference to private-law understandings of the legal system‖). 
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related to climate change provide private plaintiffs with standing.
36
 This 
context is important. As the most visible environmental issue of today, 
questions related to climate change have understandably received 
considerable attention.
37
 Similarly, important aspects of the substantive 
rules that govern taxpayer standing in the Establishment Clause context 
remain in flux.
38
 Finally, there is continuing concern that Scalia‘s view of 
standing may have a renaissance, particularly in light of the appointments 
of Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito.
39
  
The continuing robust discussion of substantive standing doctrine casts 
a long shadow, a shadow that has obscured jurisdictional procedure. But 
this is only half the story. Jurisdictional procedure also remains invisible 
because of its relative constancy and the unexamined assumption that it is 
constitutionally compelled.
40
  
The rule the Supreme Court followed in 1934 remains true today: ―An 
appellate federal court must satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, 
but also of that of the lower courts in a cause under review.‖41 This rule 
remains virtually unquestioned.
42
 The Court implies that its approach to 
                                                                                                                     
 36. See Am. Elect. Power v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011). 
 37. See generally Todd Barnet, Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency: Checks 
and Balances in Disarray, 17 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 329 (2009) (explaining how checks and 
balances can frustrate environmental regulation); Farber, supra note 1 (criticizing ideological 
standing analysis in environmental regulation cases); Saby Ghoshray, Massachusetts v. EPA: Is the 
Promise of Regulation Much Ado About Nothing? Deconstructing States Special Solicitude Against 
an Evolving Jurisprudence, 15 WIDENER L. REV. 447 (2010) (downplaying Massachusetts‘s 
importance to environmental regulation). 
 38. See, e.g., Az. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1449 (2011) (denying 
standing to taxpayers challenging state tax credit); Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 
551 U.S. 587, 614–15 (2007) (denying standing to taxpayers challenging executive office of Faith-
Based and Community Initiatives); see also Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Ball on a Needle: 
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. and the Future of Establishment Clause 
Adjudication, 2008 BYU L. REV. 115, 115–20 (2008) (arguing that Hein complicated standing for 
Establishment Clause plaintiffs); Craig A. Stern, Another Sign from Hein: Does the Generalized 
Grievance Fail a Constitutional or Prudential Test of Federal Standing to Sue?, 12 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 1169, 1170–74 (2008) (discussing constitutional status of the generalized grievance 
exception in light of Hein). 
 39. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, at 213. 
 40. There have been tweaks at the margins. For example, appellate procedure related to 
jurisdiction continues to develop for petitions for review filed directly in the courts of appeals. See 
generally Amy J. Wildermuth & Lincoln L. Davies, Standing, on Appeal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 957 
(2010). And the Supreme Court only recently suggested that questions of standing must be decided 
on the district court record, rather than on affidavits submitted directly to a court of appeals. See 
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 495 (2009).  
 41. Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934). 
 42. A report by the American Law Institute in the 1960s recommending that courts treat 
jurisdictional issues as waivable brought brief attention to jurisdictional procedure. See THE AM. 
LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 368–69, 
373–74 (1969); see also Dan B. Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter 
Jurisdiction Before Final Judgment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 491, 525–26 (1967) (citing AM. LAW INST., 
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jurisdiction is self-evidently correct as a matter of constitutional law: 
―Although raised by neither of the parties, we are first obliged to examine 
the standing of appellees, as a matter of the case-or-controversy 
requirement associated with Art. III.‖43  
The academy has followed suit. Numerous articles critique courts‘ sua 
sponte consideration of issues, but those critiques come with an important 
caveat: of course courts consider questions of jurisdiction sua sponte.
44
 
Courts did not always view the Constitution as mandating independent 
inquiry into jurisdiction. Federal courts have always treated jurisdiction 
differently than other issues.
45
 But early courts derived their procedures 
from a common law conception of the inherent nature of judicial authority, 
not from Article III.
46
 In those days, the courts‘ duty—and even ability—to 
raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte was decidedly more limited than it is 
today. Courts did assure themselves that a plaintiff properly invoked 
jurisdiction, but this was done only in reference to the complaint. If the 
complaint pled jurisdiction by asserting, for example, that the parties were 
                                                                                                                     
STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (Proposed Final 
Draft No. 1, Apr. 19, 1965)). The Institute considered the issue at a time when standing doctrine 
was in its infancy, and the report suggests that its prescriptions may not apply to cases involving 
constitutional issues. See id. 
 43. Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 331 (1977); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 
523 U.S. 83, 93 (1998).  
 44. See Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an 
Opportunity to Be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1253, 307–08 (2002) (―[I]f one accepts the 
premise that writ of error review remains the best model, appellate courts should be permitted to 
raise nonjurisdictional matters sua sponte only in the most exceptional cases, to remedy the gravest 
injustices.‖); Neal Devins, Asking the Right Questions: How Courts Honored the Separation of 
Powers by Reconsidering Miranda, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 251, 252 (2000) (―[A] central tenet of our 
adversarial system is that (save for jurisdictional issues) the parties to a case—not the judges 
deciding the case—raise the legal arguments.‖); Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing 
God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245, 249 n.12 
(2002) (―Because of the constitutional limitations on their jurisdiction, federal courts are obligated 
to examine whether they have subject matter jurisdiction in a case.‖). 
 45. See, e.g., Jackson v. Ashton, 33 U.S. (8. Pet.) 148, 148 (1834) (dismissing a case sua 
sponte for lack of jurisdiction because ―[t]he bill and proceedings should state the citizenship of the 
parties, to give the court jurisdiction of the case‖); Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126, 
126 (1804) (―The Courts of the U.S. have not jurisdiction unless the record shews [sic] that the 
parties are citizens of different states, or that one is an alien . . . .‖); Turner v. Bank of Am., 4 U.S. 
(4 Dall.) 8, 8 (1799) (―Silence, inadvertence of consent cannot give jurisdiction, where the law 
denies it.‖). 
 46. See Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884). The 
Supreme Court provided no citations for its earliest articulation of jurisdictional procedure. See, 
e.g., Capron, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 126; Turner, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 8. But notably, state courts had 
adopted similar views of their role in assessing jurisdiction, so it would be surprising if the Supreme 
Court thought itself to be articulating constitutional law. The earliest federal cases discussing the 
courts‘ roles in policing jurisdiction relied on the decisions of state courts, further illustrating that 
jurisdictional procedure was not viewed as constitutional. See Respublica v. Cobbett, 3 Dall. 467, 
476 (Pa. 1798); Kirkbride v. Durden, 1 Dall. 288, 289 (Pa. 1788). 
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fully diverse, then the court possessed jurisdiction, even if those allegations 
were unsubstantiated or later proven false.
47
 And defendants had a tightly 
circumscribed ability to challenge the complaint. To dispute facts in a 
complaint necessary for jurisdiction, the defendant needed to file a plea for 
abatement in lieu of an answer.
48
 If the court rejected the plea, the 
defendant was deemed to concede liability on the merits.
49
 
The Judiciary Act of 1875 changed that practice, requiring courts to 
consider at any time whether cases before them ―really and substantially 
involve a dispute or controversy properly within the[ir] jurisdiction.‖50 
Thereafter, courts took it upon themselves to sniff out potential 
jurisdictional defects based on ―the facts as they really exist,‖51 causing 
jurisdictional procedure to drift further from the adversarial norms that 
animate our legal system. Over time, this statutory duty morphed into a 
constitutional duty, with the Court seeming to suggest that jurisdictional 
procedure has remained constant since the beginning of the Republic. So, 
for example, in Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, the Court restates the modern 
rule of jurisdictional procedure but relies on a case applying the original, 
limited rule that courts have an obligation merely to consider whether the 
allegations properly invoked jurisdiction.
52
  
Courts and scholars today accept current modes of jurisdictional 
procedure as an article of faith. As a result, little attention has been paid to 
how precisely courts decide questions of standing, and whether—as I 
believe—unfairness arises from that process.  
III.  JURISDICTIONAL PROCEDURE‘S REFORM 
If jurisdictional procedure shapes access to the courts, what is to be 
done? Courts currently use a procedure that deviates from the ordinary 
course of business in our adversarial legal system—a procedure that 
authorizes the sandbagging of plaintiffs late in the game and long after they 
have lost the opportunity to provide evidence of standing. We currently act 
                                                                                                                     
 47. See Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1829, 1839–40 
(2007).  
 48. See Steigleder v. McQuesten, 198 U.S. 141, 142 (1905) (―[U]nder the judiciary act of 
1789 an issue as to the fact of citizenship could only be made by plea in abatement when the 
pleadings properly averred citizenship . . . .‖). 
 49. See Collins, supra note 47, at 41. 
 50. The Judiciary Act of 1875 § 5. 
 51. Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U.S. 115, 120 (1898). 
 52. 546 U.S. 303, 316 (2006) (citing Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 
111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)). While Mansfield was decided after the 1875 Judiciary Act, the case was 
filed in 1874 and the Supreme Court followed the pre-1875 practice of considering only the 
allegations in the petition for removal to determine that the case was improperly removed to federal 
court. In other words, Mansfield applied only the common-law rule that courts must consider the 
sufficiency of allegations, not the modern rule that courts must assure themselves of jurisdiction 
based on the facts in the record.  
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as though parties should know better and volunteer evidence before the 
district court to satisfy any conceivable standard that the court of appeals or 
Supreme Court might later apply. But when academics and judges struggle 
to derive clear, determinate rules from the maze of case law addressing 
standing, it hardly seems fair to expect plaintiffs to answer possible 
standing objections unprompted.  
If current jurisdictional procedure is a problem—as this Essay 
contends—we could infuse it with familiar adversarial norms, requiring 
defendants to raise subject matter jurisdiction defenses just as they must 
raise other defenses. When defendants raise jurisdiction in the district 
court, plaintiffs will have an opportunity to meet the challenge at a time 
when the evidentiary record remains open.  
Attempting to reform jurisdictional procedure in this way would make 
standing decisions fairer. But the attempt would face considerable 
obstacles. Our modern procedures grew out of the Judiciary Act of 1875 
and were once statutory in character. But the courts now view the 
obligation to consider jurisdiction as constitutional, making reform of this 
sort difficult.  
I also believe that recasting jurisdictional procedure as an adversarial 
process would be a mistake. Federal courts have assumed an increasingly 
important position in our separation of powers in the centuries since the 
framing of the Constitution. Judicial review has broadened, and judicial 
supremacy now reins.
53
 Today, federal courts exercise unparalleled 
authority to police the other branches of the federal government. And, 
because they have the final say about the meaning of the Constitution and 
federal statutes, federal courts largely operate beyond the kinds of external 
checks and balances that the Constitution places on the President and 
Congress.
54
 Jurisdictional procedure fills this gap, creating an important 
internal constraint on judicial authority.  
If jurisdictional procedure cannot become adversarial, then what? One 
straightforward and sensible possibility is for courts of appeals to remand, 
                                                                                                                     
 53. Judicial review and judicial supremacy were not always a given under our Constitution. 
For a detailed and insightful history of each doctrine, see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 
 54. The Constitution does vest Congress with the power to impeach federal judges. See U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 4. But the impeachment power only permits removal of judges for illegal or 
improper personal conduct, not because of their judicial decisions. See generally Keith E. 
Whittington, Reconstructing the Federal Judiciary: The Chase Impeachment and the Constitution, 
9 STUDIES IN AM. POL. DEV. 55 (1995). Congress and the President arguably have other means of 
checking the judiciary by adjusting the number of justices on the Court, stripping the courts of 
jurisdiction, or reducing judicial budgets. See John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent 
Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 963–64 
(2002). But courts have authority to pass on the constitutionality of any of these mechanisms, 
meaning that they require judicial assent to serve as a limitation on judicial authority. See Pidot, 
supra note 3, working draft at 8–16. 
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rather than deciding jurisdictional questions themselves. If questions of 
standing return to trial judges, then parties could supplement the record to 
try to meet the legal standard identified on appeal. This would address 
some of the fairness concerns created by the current model of standing as a 
procedural trap. Requiring remand would also reduce the appeal that 
standing may have to ideologically-motivated appellate judges. If a judge 
can only remand the case, it seems less enticing to apply malleable 
standing standards to disadvantage disfavored plaintiffs. After all, if the 
plaintiffs can provide evidence sufficient to overcome whatever standing 
rule the court of appeals articulates, the case will proceed. 
More radical options exist too. Courts have already claimed ownership 
of jurisdictional issues by insisting that they must consider them sua 
sponte. We could improve jurisdictional procedure by requiring courts to 
also take ownership for the investigation of jurisdictional facts.
55
 This 
would facilitate remand, since district courts are natural receptacles for 
such a duty. It would also serve the important function of ensuring that 
courts not only decline to act in excess of their jurisdiction, but also act 
where jurisdiction is proper.
56
  
CONCLUSION 
Substantive standing doctrine has received much scholarly attention. 
Many commentators have argued that the modern doctrine bears little 
relationship to the constitutional provision it purports to vindicate.
57
 And 
scholars have suggested alternatives. For example, the courts could 
abandon the injury-in-fact test,
58
 could presume plaintiffs have standing 
unless ―particular dangers of overreaching outweigh predispositions 
towards jurisdiction,‖59 or could adopt an alternative approach (at least for 
some cases) requiring plaintiffs to show only an ―appropriate personal 
connection‖ to ―specific geographic areas.‖60 Such changes, their advocates 
hope, would depoliticize standing decisions and result in more predictable, 
more fair outcomes. 
But the substance of standing doctrine has consequences for relatively 
few types of cases. On the other hand, the procedures by which courts 
decide questions of standing have much broader effect. Those procedures, 
                                                                                                                     
 55.  See Pidot, supra note 3, for a detailed account of the benefits of this more radical revision 
of jurisdictional procedure. 
 56. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) 
(noting that courts have a ―virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given to 
them‖). 
 57. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 19, at 166; see also William A. Fletcher, The Structure of 
Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 224–25 (1988). 
 58. See Sunstein, supra note 19, at 167. 
 59. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. 
REV. 301, 340 (2002). 
 60. Dan Farber, A Place-Based Theory of Standing, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1505, 1505 (2008). 
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unfortunately, have received little attention, even though they have 
profound consequences. This Essay thus calls attention to jurisdictional 
procedure and suggests that it is ripe for reform. Such reform would retain 
the essence of modern practice, vindicate the separation of powers 
principles that animate standing and other jurisdictional doctrines, and 
achieve fairness and judicial neutrality.  
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